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The WTO after the Singapore Ministerial:
Much to Do about What?
by Dean Spinanger
CONTENTS
The World Trade Organization's (WTO) Singapore Ministerial Conference in De-
cember, 1996, represented the first review of where the WTO was almost two
years after the Marrakech signing. Unfortunately, neither in implementing Marra-
kech agreements nor in dealing with new issues is the post-Singapore state of the
world trading system fundamentally better off than before.
Nothing was done to correct the "sham liberalization" in the phasing out of market
access restrictions in textiles and clothing. By backloading liberalization of the
most sensitive clothing products to the latest possible time, an impasse is being
created which could well cause but yet another delay in eliminating these quanti-
tative restrictions, which are very costly in terms of allocative efficiency.
The core of market access was seemingly brushed over to make room for an
agreement on free trade in information technology products, which is flawed for
two reasons. First, it excludes highly protected consumer electronics and second,
it expanded the international marketing "cartel" for semiconductors to include the
EU and Korea (plus founding members US and Japan).
Anti-dumping measures (ADMs), the essence of so-called contingent protection,
have continued to play a major role in trying to reduce competition, but the Minis-
terial widely ignored this fact. Though their use by industrialized countries has
slowed down noticeably, developing countries pose a new threat by enacting
ADMs all the more, particularly against other developing countries.
The Singapore Ministerial failed to clearly set the stage for fulfilling the WTO's
brief as a universal institution. No clear guidelines were established to quickly and
effectively bring Russia and China into the WTO. Instead, the status quo of en-
forcing unilateral actions against a state-trading economy still appeals to indus-
trialized countries, probably for mainly non-economic reasons.
In perhaps one of its most important decisions, the Singapore Ministerial set up a
working group to examine competition policies. Yet the key question is whether
trade liberalization and GATT/WTO discipline will be best served by adding to the
trading system a global codex, harmonizing national competition policies ex ante,
or by mutually recognizing well-functioning national competition policies. While
sound economic arguments support the latter, prevailing country-of-destination
principles conjure up concerns that the former will dictate the approach.
Finally, it may be too early to extrapolate the current success of the dispute set-
tlement mechanism (DSM). It still remains to be seen whether Contracting Parties
will really accept decisions against their expressed interests in issues of critical
importance, or where national security arguments are invoked. So far, however,
the success of the DSM has exceeded expectations.
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The World Trade Organization's (WTO) Sin-
gapore Ministerial Conference in December,
1996, represented a milestone in the history of
post WW-D Multilateral Trade Negotiations
(MTN). After the signing of the Final Act of
the Uruguay Round (UR) in Marrakech in
April, 1994, it was the first time in the context
of such MTN that stocktaking, analysis and
review of future options formed the basis of the
agenda. Furthermore, new liberalization options
were also to be considered or rather new areas
into which the WTO could extend its coverage
were placed on the docket. Although the Minis-
terial itself was merely a consequence of the
agreed-upon modalities comprising the UR
Agreement
1, massive differences of opinion on
key issues in the run-up to Singapore threatened
to disrupt if not postpone it. The fact that the
Conference was carried out as planned could
hence be interpreted as an expression of how
serious UR commitments were and are being
taken.
After all, if one reflects back on the time
when the 123 country representatives
2 signed
the final UR documents an upbeat evaluation
seemed justified, since the spectrum and depth
of areas covered by the agreements were far
greater than the prevailing GATT framework.
3
In other words: the UR agreements reflect to a
far greater degree the major structural shifts in
international economic activities which had de-
veloped since the 1947 GATT, but had never
really been incorporated into the seven pre-
ceding MTN rounds (see Table A2). As can
be seen in Table 1, over 90 percent of world
trade originates from member countries. When
China, Taiwan, Russia and Saudi Arabia be-
come WTO members, then virtually all world
trade is covered. For sure, initial estimates
about the impact of the UR underlined the ex-
tremely positive sectoral impact of the agree-
ments (see Table A3). And to ensure that such
estimates turn into reality rather than ending up
as fiction, the Singapore Ministerial had to suc-
ceed.
4
Such success was by no means guaranteed as
the initial optimism had dimmed considerably
prior to the Ministerial. This was not merely a
tentative conclusion drawn from the failure in
liberalizing financial services, from the initial
impasse in the area of telecommunications, or
from the suspended negotiations in maritime
services. It also may have stemmed from the
realization that truth in the packaging, for in-
stance in the all-important Agreement on Tex-
tiles and Clothing (ATC), may not actually
have prevailed in the final context. Such was
the stage prior to Singapore.
The bottom line was accordingly simply
stated: if the WTO was to live up to the high
expectations spawned at the signing of the
Final Act in Marrakech, it had to set and truly
abide by priorities. First and foremost, it had to
ensure that agreed-upon issues continue to be
wrapped up in line with the letter but also with
the spirit of the agreements. That is: no back-
Table 1 — Number of WTO Members and Potential Members















































Source: WTO home page, IMF (1996: 114-117), WTO (1996a: Vol. II, Table A3).sliding. Beyond this, it had then to seek sub-
stantial results in those key areas where nego-
tiations failed to bear fruit. That is: no reneging
on pledges. Having firmly accomplished these
tasks, and only then, could it shift its attention
to areas which would deal both with new issues
as well as with the deepening or widening
the scope of prevailing agreements without
weakening what has been achieved. That is: no
widening of GATT/WTO domains if this implies
weakening the brief of the organization.
First of all, the key issues as they presented
themselves at the outset of the Singapore Min-
isterial will be briefly overviewed and basically
structured in line with their international eco-
nomic relevance. Then the issues will be dealt
with individually, beginning each time with
some background before laying down what
could have been expected to be improved or
achieved in line with the UR agreements and
what was actually accomplished. The paper
then concludes by laying down possible strat-
egies to ensure that the WTO — as opposed to
GATT — will not become a victim of vested
interests against trade liberalization.
II. The Issues on the Docket in Singapore — What Was Relevant?
In the months leading up to the Singapore Min-
isterial there was at best agreement on not try-
ing to launch a new round of omnibus trade
negotiations. This was surely very sensible. But
even aside from this consensus the docket was
more than full. Almost two dozen separate
issues were listed on documents distributed
by the WTO prior to the Ministerial, whereby
numerous, highly controversial issues had not
even been completed before the conference
began (e.g. the extensive discussions on how or
whether to speed up the liberalization in agree-
ment on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) was one
of them).
5 The diversity of issues to be acted
upon is, however, more correctly reflected in
the organizational structure of the WTO, since
it is within such confines that the preparations
for the Ministerial took place (see Diagram 1).
In addition to this breakdown, however, it is
necessary to add those topics which were still
in the process of being discussed; that is, labor
standards, competition policy, and the infor-
mation technology agreement.
To highlight the international economic rami-
fications of the decisions at the Ministerial,
three major areas are to be addressed:
A: The Essentials — What needed to be com-
pleted as dictated by the UR agreements, be
it stipulated by the built-in agenda or de-
manded due to severe weaknesses in the UR
documents?
B: Other Issues — What was left open or not
sufficiently defined in the UR agreements?
C: New Topics — What was new, be it by lib-
eralizing (that is improving market access)
beyond the UR, increasing the coverage of
the WTO to new or by expanding the cover-
age of given agreements by ensuring that
WTO rules are universally applicable?
Within the above three areas the following, by
no means all encompassing, relevant economic
issues
6 will be discussed:
A: Given that the basic thrust of the WTO is to
substantially reduce tariffs and other bar-
riers to trade as well as to eliminate dis-
criminatory treatment, it seems appropriate
to begin by examining what had been done
to improve market access. This will first of
all be analyzed with respect to (1) textile
and clothing products, i.e. that area which
originally was allowed to widely deviate
from MFN principles. It then turns (2) to
market access in general, that is the degree
to which the UR agreements were adhered
to. In this section, the Information Tech-
nology Agreement (ITA) will also be in-
cluded as well as issues concerning special
























































































































Source: WTO website (1997a).B: This section begins by discussing two
specific issues which also affect market ac-
cess, albeit under the veil of other inten-
tions, namely (1) anti-dumping measures
and (2) technical standards and similar
measures. It then focuses on one important
topic evolving from the General Agreement
in Trade in Services (GATS), namely (3)
telecommunications. It then turns to the
complexities of (4) regional trade agree-
ments. To conclude, the functioning of the
all-important (5) dispute settlement mechan-
isms will be focused on.
C: The focus here begins by analyzing the new
and highly controversial issue of incorpor-
ating internationally accepted (1) labor stan-
dards in the WTO. It then shifts to whether
(2) competition policies — that is, above
and beyond the competition engendered by
more open trade regimes — are likewise an
area in which the WTO should become in-
volved. Discussion then moves to an exam-
ination of the protracted (3) process of ad-
mitting new members, specifically the issue
of China's long-standing application is ana-
lyzed. In other words, it deals with the pro-
cess of ensuring that WTO principles be-
come universally applicable.
III. The Essentials
1. Textiles and Clothing Trade
— a Major Juggernaut
a. Background
High on the Singapore docket — at least for the
developing countries (DCs) — was the degree
to which textile and clothing (T&C) products
were being effectively and finally integrated
into WTO principles of non-discrimination, lib-
eralization and rule discipline. This was all the
more the case given that trade restrictions
on T&C products — in essence the "mother" of
GATT-inconsistent measures (already in exist-
ence in the 1950s) — almost gridlocked the
preparations for the Singapore Ministerial. It
was in particular the criticism from Asian coun-
tries, which account for about 45 percent of the
world's T&C exports, that was labeling T&C
trade liberalization "sham integration" being all
too obviously instituted by the EU and the USA
in postponing a true liberalization of their T&C
imports.
7 It was a sham — even if permitted de
jure by the ATC — because none of the T&C
products restricted by the MFA were being lib-
eralized.
8
But beyond this, for instance, was an "offer"
made in the course of 1996 by the EU. It "of-
fered" a faster T&C liberalization track if Asian
countries were to open up their own economies
faster. The offer was rejected for numerous
reasons, but perhaps also because it did not
apply to Hongkong, Macao or Singapore, who
found that they could not open up their already
open economies any further!
Likewise affecting the tactics of the EU and
the US to be less liberal in their ATC strategies
were regional integration schemes in which
they were involved. In the case of the EU, these
were already having a far more profound effect
on Europe's economic landscape than the on-
going initial implementation of the UR agree-
ments. Specifically, the completion of the
single market in the EU as of January 1, 1993,
the expansion of the EU from 12 to 15 mem-
bers as of January 1, 1995, and the attempts to
integrate the Eastern European economies, all
had prompted T&C industries throughout Eu-
rope to more rapidly rethink corporate strat-
egies. Given the importance of minimizing the
economic distance between locations of pro-
duction and consumption, just-in-time produc-
tion was obviously easier to achieve with coun-
tries next door than with producers in Asia. On
the other side of the Atlantic came the im-
plications of the NAFTA, which likewise was
shifting demand away from suppliers of T&C
products in Asia.
9Thus, going into the Singapore Ministerial
developing countries obviously felt they had
been promised for more than the ATC was
delivering. In the months before the Ministerial
they were thus demanding improvements,
otherwise threatening to block the Singapore
meeting.
What had been agreed upon in the UR is
simply stated:
- the MFA is to be phased out in four tranches




- products not liberalized, but under quota or
elsewise restrained will have their growth




- all types of textile products (i.e. tops/yarns,
fabrics, made-ups and clothing) must be in-
cluded in each of the liberalization tranches
during the 10 years;
1
2
- the liberalization process for members is
binding and final.
And finally, it could be concluded that the
negotiating parties were indeed serious in ef-
fectively dismantling the MFA as in Article 7,
para. 1 of the ATC (GATT 1994a) the word
"promote" had been replaced with the more
forceful word "achieve."
b. What Should Have Been Achieved?
However, the "modalities" to "permit the event-
ual integration" (GATT 1994a: 85) of T&C
products into MFN treatment almost invited
avoiding a meaningful integration. It was there-
fore not surprising that tire cords, tampons and
tents ended up on the list of products liber-
alized by Canada, the EU and the USA in the
first round, thus causing DCs to consider the
ATC to be a sham. As the WTO Council for
Trade in Goods noted (1996b: para. 16.4): "The
first stage integration had therefore not mean-
ingfully improved access to these markets."
Hence, the following issues were begging to
be dealt with in Singapore:
- Why did the ATC not stipulate that T&C
products not under quota or other restraints
would be more quickly reintegrated into
GATT/WTO MFN principles outside of the
10 year liberalization process? By not doing so,
the amount of ATC products specified in the
Agreement is considerably larger than the
number covered by existing restraints be it in
the EU, USA or Canada.
- Why were not faster integration schedules
specified for those MFA products under quota,
but with only minimal quota utilization (i.e.
quota redundancy)?
- Why were volumes used in specifying the
amounts to be liberalized, as this virtually
ensures that the economic value of the product
liberalized is only loosely correlated with the
amount liberalized?
- The agreed-upon increase in growth rates
during the course of the liberalization period
means very little if the actual growth rates are
small (see Table A4). Knowing that the as-
signed growth rates for major Asian suppliers




- Why is it merely stipulated that at each stage
of the liberalization process only something
from the four types of T&C products must be
included (i.e. tops/yarns, fabrics, made-ups and
apparel)? This leads to most perverting devel-
opments, as it virtually predestines sensitive
products (basically clothing) to being totally
underrepresented. The DCs were hence correct-
ly predicting that most of the clothing products
would not be liberalized until the year 2005.
- Hence, what can be done to avoid a "crunch"
in the final phase-out of the MFA as of
1/1/2005? The EU (as well as the US) put itself
in a position where it would become virtually
impossible to liberalize the remaining 49 per-
cent at that point in time.
c. What Was Achieved?
The agreement on the ATC reached in Singa-
pore was hollow to the extent that it did nothing
to rectify any of the above listed weaknesses.
What it did contain, however, was stronger
wording with respect to truly integrating textile
and clothing products into MFN principles. It
also states that safeguards will be used as spar-ingly as possible. And finally, it does underline
the importance of ensuring that small suppliers,
new entrants and least developed countries
should receive special treatment.
In other words, there were no hard measures
agreed upon to turn the sham liberalization into
something meaningful. In hard numbers, this
means nothing more than liberalizing roughly
90 percent of all clothing imports by the EU
and the USA in the two final liberalization
periods (i.e. in 2002 and 2005). Doubts about
the capacity to fulfill this commitment are more
than justified.
Hence, when and if the built-in weaknesses
in the ATC do indeed lead to a crunch in the
liberalization process as practiced by the EU
and US so far, the only recourse would be to
enlist the support of the dispute settlement
mechanism in the WTO. As difficult as such
task may be, at least the WTO — as opposed to
the GATT — does now contain weapons to
fight strategies to deliberately delay T&C liber-
alization. So far the dispute settlement mechan-
ism seems to have worked well (see below), but
it remains to be seen whether this will also
apply to such important and labor-intensive in-
dustries like those producing textile and cloth-
ing products.
2. Market Access: On Tariffs, the
ITA and Special Concessions
a. Background
As evidenced by the sham liberalization in the
ATC, agreeing on improved market access
1
4 is
one thing, turning it into reality is definitely
another. Table A2 clearly confirms that the UR
was by far the most comprehensive round in
terms of products covered. While the decrease
in the tariff rates was not as large as in the
Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations
(col. 6), the post-UR tariff levels reached in




The average post-UR tariff for all industrial
goods imported by high-income economies
(HIEs) was just 2.5 percent, with important pro-
duct areas like electric machinery, non-electric
machinery and miscellaneous manufactured
products (containing, e.g. electronic equipment
and scientific devices) revealing even lower or
rather considerably lower rates. While the low
to middle-income economies (LMUEs) still had
double-digit tariff rates across almost all
product groups, and on average were over four
times higher than HIEs, it is most significant
that the percentage of LMIE tariffs bound ex-
ceeded 80 percent and was thus just roughly 10
percent lower than in the case of HIEs. Prior to
the UR only 32 percent of the LMIE tariffs




The adjustment to the agreed-upon UR tariff
rates is supposed to be carried out in a stepwise
manner beginning in January 1, 1995, and ef-
fected by all member countries by no later than
January 1, 1999. For some countries, however,
later deadlines were agreed upon, be it due to
their low level of development or to special ar-
rangements made for particular commodities.
Monitoring of the individual country obli-
gations, based on their tariff schedules submit-
ted to the WTO, is not foreseen with systematic
control or reporting procedures. What does
exist, however, are reverse notifications if the
submitted obligations cannot be adhered to. In
addition, should individual countries be sub-
jected to a Trade Policy Review (see TPR Body
in Diagram 1), then the extent to which tariffs
are not being reduced in line with UR obli-
gations, would be commented on in such a
point in time.
1
7 But such reviews would occur
for smaller countries no more than once every
four, six or more years.
1
8
Understandably, market access via tariff re-
ductions at the Singapore Ministerial was not
merely restricted to the agreed-upon reductions
in the UR. Perhaps most important in this con-
nection were the negotiations on information
technology (IT) products, which had been in-
itially brought to the fore by the USA. In the
course of 1996 the US began to push the issue
as an area in which completely liberalized trade
was to be realized. This seemed to be all the
more promising given the key role information
technology products play in all economies, thegrowth potential of such products as well as
their importance in world trade.
Just how important these IT products have
become in recent years can be seen in Table
A6: They now account for over one eighth of
the world's exports, up almost 50 percent in the
period 1990-1995. But perhaps even more im-
portant with respect to factors shaping trade
policy moves prior to the Singapore Ministerial
is the relative importance of IT products for the
individual countries, as this reflects negotiation
preferences. Whereas countries like Singapore,
Malaysia, Korea and Taiwan revealed above-
average export shares in the range of 60-25
percent, even countries like Ireland, Japan, the
USA and the United Kingdom had achieved
above-average shares in the range of 25-15 per-
cent. That extra-EU trade is relatively small is
surprising.
1
9 Perhaps even more surprising is
the fact that Germany's extra-EU IT exports are
just barely larger than those of Mexico or
Canada.
Aside from this, tactical reasons could also
have prompted the US to table such a proposal.
That is, it became evident early on in the dis-
cussions in the various committees/working
groups at the WTO during preparations for the
Singapore Ministerial, that the issue of labor
standards was not going to be on the Singapore
Ministerial declaration in a manner which
would satisfy pressure groups in the USA.
By selecting IT products, not only was future-
oriented, cutting-edge technology being sup-
ported. Just as important was the fact that the
industry, as labor/human capital intensive as it
might be in some areas, was not organized
in a manner to engender protectionist interest
against possible increased competition via im-
ports. This was all the more the case knowing
that tariffs were in many cases very low to
begin with.
Finally, improved access to HIEs for the
least developed countries (LLDCs) via lower or
no trade barriers is the third access issue to be
discussed here. It is one which has become all
the more crucial, the lower the average level of
MFN tariffs become.
2
0 In the past, GATT/
WTO paid tribute to the demands of LLDCs in
numerous ways. This was first specified in the
general aims of the GATT/WTO. But more im-
portant it became embedded in specific exemp-
tions in the treaties themselves, i.e. by permit-
ting exceptions to otherwise binding GATT/
WTO rules. As concerns the UR (see Diagram
1), a special committee deals with aspects of
trade and development and an attached sub-
committee specifically covers least developed
countries. As a matter of fact, virtually all the
UR Agreements incorporated provisions which
explicitly specified more favorable treatment of
the least developed countries.
While in the case of non-tariff barriers on
T&C products, i.e. the enaction of the MFA,
which was never officially given dispensation
by GATT, exemptions to MFN principles vis-
a-vis LLDCs have been officially sanctioned.
In the past it has been primarily the Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP) which has re-
ceived the most attention.
2
1 Based on the so-
called "Enabling Clause" on special and differ-
ential treatment of developing countries,
2
2 the
GATT/WTO framework merely provides the
legal basis for HIEs to provide special prefer-
ences.
Since it does not state how this should be ef-
fected, it is left to the individual HIEs them-
selves to structure their own systems. This has
led to widely differing regulations and to much
ambiguity as concerns the interpretation of
what is actually permitted. Actually, it probably
could be contended that the GSP, particularly
as concerns the rules of origin, has basically
been turned into an instrument of commercial
policy.
It can hardly be surprising to determine that
across the EU, US and Japanese GSP regu-
lations no common coherent set of rules gov-
erning rules of origin exists. Although the UR
established a committee on rules of origin, the
Round itself failed to adequately specify how
origin should be defined. This increases the un-
certainty surrounding the eligibility of a given
product to receive preferential treatment. Thus
the possibility is all the greater that trade bar-
riers are enacted when exporters become par-
ticularly "competitive." On top of this, the US
and the EU have expressed their intention to
graduate more middle-income countries out of10
the GSP, albeit applying differing definitions
and procedures as concerning when and how
countries are to be graduated out.
2
3
b. What Should Have Been Achieved?
Whatever else might have been on the docket
of the Singapore Ministerial, securing market
access in line with the UR Agreements should
have been foremost. In other words: Are the
MFN tariff changes being carried out? Since
the WTO leaves it up to the individual coun-
tries to report on their own implementation of
the tariff reductions or rather on its failure to do
so,
2
4 the "honor system" prevails. Given bind-
ing WTO budget constraints, this may be the
only possible solution. However, at the Minis-
terial the question needed to be answered as to
how implementation is being effected.
2
5 The
report by the Market Access Committee under-
lines the need for increased control, in com-
menting on notification of quantitative restric-
tions in its pre-Ministerial stocktaking: Al-
though all WTO members were to report the
state of such restrictions to the Secretariat by
January 16, 1996, only 22 members had done
so by November 4, 1996. It is thus only conse-
quent that the Council for Trade in Goods re-
quested the Ministerial to establish "a body
with a mandate to review the notification obli-
gations and procedures throughout the WTO
Agreement" (WTO [GAL/134] 1996b: 30).
The proposal put forth by the US to totally
liberalize IT products by the year 2000 should
have been considered for approval only after a
thorough evaluation of the fulfillment of UR
Agreements. That is: unfinished business first,
new matters if time allows.
As concerns preferential treatment of LLDCs,
if this is to be continued as one possible
means of improving the economic development
chances of the receiving countries, then it must
be ensured that — across the board — the same
procedures apply. This not only means per-
mitting a full range of products to be included
by all donor countries as well as clearly de-
fined, liberal rules of origin but also similar,
explicit conditions with respect to being gradu-
ated out of the GSP.
c. What Was Achieved?
The Singapore Ministerial did little to ensure
that implementation of UR Agreements was
being fully carried out. Despite the "high pri-
ority" attached to a "full and effective im-
plementation," no WTO bodies were mandated
to more forcefully oversee developments nor
were additional bodies created to do so. In ad-
dition to this, the resources of the WTO itself
have not been placed on a foundation which
would permit the organization to effectively
carry out the many new tasks assigned to it. Are
those WTO members responsible for sharing
most of the financial burden, playing politics
with the organization, so as to make it less ef-
fective?
Instead of ensuring that UR Agreements
have been adhered to, the Singapore Ministerial
was used as an arena in which much time was
spent hammering out the details of the IT
Agreement (ITA). It foresaw a complete elim-
ination of tariffs on IT products by 1/1/2000.
2
6
However, the implementation of the ITA was
made dependent on increasing the number of
signatory countries so at least 90 percent of
world trade in ITA products was covered by
1/4/1997,
2
7 This target was already achieved in
the course of March 1997 when 40 participants,
accounting for 92.5 percent of world trade in FT
products, agreed to enact implementation.
2
8
In this industry, complete liberalization of
internationally traded products has not been
achieved. In particular, finished goods such as
consumer electronics still enjoy protection in
industrial countries as evidenced not only by
tariff escalation and thus relatively high rates of
effective protection but also by numerous anti-
dumping actions initiated against Asian NIEs.
Furthermore, ironically, the ITA helped cement
a non-GATT consistent agreement between
Japan and the United States concerning the
marketing of semiconductors and expanded its




The measures agreed upon in Singapore to
promote a better integration of LLDCs into the
international division of labor seemed to be
more forceful than what had been stated within11
the UR Agreements. Not only was a Plan of
Action announced, to include for instance duty-
free access, but assistance in improving con-
ditions for investment and fostering market ac-
cess for LLDCs' products were proposed. Like-
wise, improvements in the Global System of
Trade Preferences
3
0 were promised. Although
it remains to be seen which specific measures
will be effected in this connection, there would
seem to be a degree of willingness to do more
for those countries which have not yet ben-
efited from the expansion in world trade. But it
nonetheless also remains to be seen, whether
HIEs will continue to be willing even when
such countries do become competitive in sen-
sitive areas, in exporting T&C products.
3
1 It
would not be the first time that increased ex-
ports from LLDCs, like Bangladesh, led to re-
strictions in HIEs (see Spinanger 1987).
IV. Other Issues
1. Anti-Dumping Measures
One of the most divisive trade policy instru-
ments in recent years have been anti-dumping
measures (ADMs). They are divisive because
their initiation virtually marks exporters as
being guilty of trying to engage in predatory
competition, even though such accusations
have never really been proven. They are also
divisive because — if dumping is "substan-
tiated" by applying the accepted rules — they
force consumers to accept higher prices and a
more limited product selection. Finally, they
are divisive because they impede industrial
purchasers using such goods as intermediates
in international competition. All this would
have been reason enough to have AD rules
tabled as a major issue at the Singapore Minis-
terial.
But not even the extensive use of ADMs
over the past decade by industrialized coun-
tries (ICs), and the ever more extensive use by
developing countries (LDCs) in the course of
the 1990s (see Table A7), led to ADMs being
prominently placed on the Singapore agenda.
The issue was merely listed as part of the
built-in agenda.
3
2 While it is true that in the
UR a reformulation and a more demanding list
of preconditions for using ADMs were agreed
upon, these by no means eliminate and do not
even minimize their use as one of the stronger
forms of contingent protection.
To begin with, however, there is some good
news: the total number of ADMs decreased
noticeably in recent years, from roughly 240
per year in the period 1991-1994 to 150 per
year in the two years thereafter (see Table A8).
And particularly encouraging is that those in-
itiated by industrialized countries — account-
ing for over 90 percent of the cases in the
1990-1994 period — dropped by almost two-
thirds. The bad news is that developing
countries have evidently found it quite
opportune, if not effective, to enact ADMs. As
a matter of fact, they finally surpassed in-
dustrialized countries in 1995/96 and now
account for more than 60 percent of all ADMs
initiated.
3
3 It is interesting to note that de-
veloping countries did not simply reciprocate
against industrialized countries by initiating
ADMs against them. Indeed, as can clearly be
seen from Table 2 both Latin American as well
as Asian developing countries concentrated a
far greater share of their ADMs on imports
from Asian, Latin American or EE/CIS im-
ports in the 1993-1996 period than in the prior
period.
Hence the Singapore Ministerial Agenda —
despite the overt dangers emanating from a
protectionistic thrust of ADMs — failed to
ensure that long-standing weaknesses in the
UR reformulation of ADMs were discussed,
let alone corrected. The simple reason for this
lack of actions being that industrialized and
developing countries did not want to "rock the12
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"Central and South America plus Caribbean countries. — 'From Mid-East (excluding Israel) to Korea (excluding Japan).
Source: GATT, WTO documents of Committee on AD practices.
boat" as concerns ADM contingent protection.
It is of course true that a committee was set up
by the Singapore Ministerial to deal with pos-
sibly incorporating competition policies into
the WTO framework (see below). By doing so,
attempts to quash competition by engaging in
predatory dumping would naturally be covered.
But beyond this, rules of origin — a major bone




But perhaps the most indicative evidence on
how the UR AD rules are being interpreted is
how initiating countries have behaved in the
meantime. The most revealing case in point
concerned the EU in dealing with dumping pro-
ceedings against 6 major suppliers of undyed
cotton fabrics accounting for roughly 50 per-
cent of EU external imports.
3
5 After the AD
investigation had been concluded a simple
majority decision was to be taken in May,
1997, as to whether the AD duties should be
dropped or continued: the majority voted
against continuation. However, contrary to
clearly stipulated and WTO approved EU regu-
lations, the Commission initiated (upon intense
pressure from France) new review proceedings
even though the mandatory "new evidence" had
not been put forth. It was pure lobbying for jobs
in France while flaunting the WTO rules.
3
6
What could be included in a more effective
AD regulation in order to ensure it is truly
not used as "back door" protectionism? If a
national balance sheet of the measures (in-
cluding net losses for consumers and industrial
purchasers) were taken, rather than the prevail-
ing narrow industry approach, then no doubt
the most blatant forms of protectionism would
be eliminated. This would be a step in the rightBibliothek des Instituts
fur \A/e!twirisehsft Kiel
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direction, but for sure just a first step only on
the road to totally eliminating ADMs.
2. Technical Standards and Similar
Measures
With the level of tariffs on merchandise trade
decreasing and the intensity of international
trade increasing (for instance, as measured by
the degree of intra-industry trade), non-tariff
barriers in the form of technical, sanitary and
phytosanitary standards have become new
hurdles which threaten to limit market access.
3
7
Whereas codes were adopted during the Tokyo
Round, these were only binding for those
GATT members and third parties which
specifically ratified them. The Uruguay Round
changed this situation and made these agree-
ments part and parcel of the Legal Texts.
3
8 One
significant change made in the documents was
their complete integration into the WTO system
as concerns dispute settlements.
If it is an indication of how well the system
was functioning up to the Singapore Ministerial
and through mid-year 1997, it might be noted
that less than ten percent of all requests





0 sanitary or phytosanitary
issues. But does this correctly reflect the actual
trade-related impact of these measures? This is
surely not the case, as only with a WTO-wide
legal application of common principles can the
door to a trade potential be opened, which here-
tofore remained untapped. It is hence no doubt
the lack of explicit problems which prompted
the Singapore Ministerial to merely brush over
this issue by listing the measures — together
with numerous others — in the Work Pro-
gramme and Built-in Agenda.
As understandable as this may have been in
light of the full docket, it by no measure seems
justified given the sizable protectionistic impact
such measures embody. Two cases clearly
underline why such standards must be made
more transparent and more clearly linked to
hard evidence.
First, Germany submitted to the GATT in
September, 1993, the required notification con-
cerning the intention to forbid the importation
of textile products containing certain azo-dyes
by the end of 1993. The reason given was that
they were carcinogens.
4
1 The notification gave
no indication whatsoever of the fact that, had
the ordinance actually entered into force by the
end of the year 1993, a very large share of im-
ports of textiles and clothing would have been
banned. The ordinance could not finally put
into force until 1996 (it was postponed several
times), after it became apparent that the dead-
lines could not be met. After all, textile and
clothing companies around the world (but par-
ticularly in Asia) had to be able to ensure they
had purged azo-dyes from their products.
Second, the ban imposed by the EC in 1989
on the importation of hormone-treated beef
from Canada and the USA was based on the
contention that such hormones could cause
cancer and other abnormalities in human. The
US and Canada accordingly took the case into
the DSM and in July, 1997, a WTO DS Panel
determined that no hard evidence on the pur-
ported link could be found.
From the above it can be concluded, first of
all, that notifications of proposed technical bar-
riers to trade need to incorporate reasonable
estimates of the amount of imported products
affected
4
2 in a manner which clearly and
coherently illustrates the magnitude of impact.
Secondly, why should not, in all those cases
where subjective (borderline) judgments are
made, consumers be left with the option making
their own choice based on clearly labeled pro-
ducts? If this was applicable in the case of the
German Purity Law for beer,
4
3 why should it
not function in the case of beef? For sure, the
number of cases where technical, sanitary and
phytosanitary measures hinder trade will in-
crease all the more — particularly in develop-
ing countries — the more the impact of trade
liberalization works its way through the econ-
omies. To prevent such tendencies an explicit
effort should have been taken to ensure that the
welfare benefits of tariff liberalization are not
nullified by a proliferation of NTBs.
Even more important, the issue of mutual
recognition of national standards (provided that
the product has been orderly marketed in the14
origin countries for many years without dam-
aging consumers' health) points to the critical
distinction between the origin country principle
and the destination country principle. The Ger-
man beer case and the respective EU ruling ex-
emplifies the country of origin principle which
allows for competition between different na-
tional standards. Such competition is made im-
possible in the WTO framework, ruled by the
national treatment requirement which is deter-
mined by the country of destination principle.
Under this principle, it is WTO-consistent to
refuse national standards of trading partners if
domestic producers of like products subject to
their own stricter standards, would be less
favorably treated than imports and thus would
be discriminated against imports.
3. Basic Telecommunications
Basic telecoms was not on the agenda of the
Singapore Ministerial for the simple reason that
negotiations, which had been put on hold in
April, 1996, were not due to be officially re-
sumed until mid-January, 1997.
4
4 While there
were numerous reasons for not reaching an
agreement by the end of April, 1996, it was
basically the United States which did not view
the number of offers, as well as their coverage,
as sufficient and accordingly refused to ratify
what had been agreed upon till then. Hence, the
expectations placed on the Singapore Minis-
terial were essentially to provide the needed
impulses to successfully conclude negotiations.
This was all the more crucial knowing that
basic telecoms represented the first major agree-
ment in the area of services. Success could thus
help to promote the stalled talks on financial
and maritime transport services. The partici-
pants seemed to have been aware of their re-
sponsibilities in this connection and adopted a
relatively strongly worded statement.
4
5
That such efforts were made by the in-
dustrialized countries to finally reach agree-
ment with 69 governments — as opposed to 48
as of April 30, 1996 — might be difficult to
understand realizing that the EU, Japan and the
United States alone accounted for almost 75
percent of the world telecom revenues in
1995.
4
6 However, first of all the growth poten-
tial in the developing countries — particularly
in Asia — was a driving force behind the in-
sistence that more countries join or rather im-
prove their offers.
4
7 And secondly, basic tele-
coms was an area in which most countries had
maintained highly restricted markets through
government run or sanctioned monopolies.
Being able to gain access to these markets
would rapidly expand the potential revenues as
well as the demand for telecom equipment.
An overriding incentive for all countries to
achieve agreement was the fact that basic tele-
com services are a key ingredient in securing/
maintaining locational competitiveness. This is
not only highly relevant in the case of financial
services, but is becoming ever more relevant in
globalized industries and just-in-time produc-
tion strategies. Obviously, any country attempt-
ing to restrict access to state-of-the-art telecom
services is putting itself at a competitive dis-
advantage in a world where the factor time is
becoming an ever more crucial ingredient in
economic decisions.
The agreement in basic telecom services,
reached on February 15th, 1997, was based on
principles as prescribed in the General Agree-
ment in Trade in Services (GATS). These were
basically MFN principles unless otherwise an
exemption was claimed.
4
8 It was signed by 69
governments (if EU countries are considered
separately). 44 governments had improved their
offer vis-a-vis April 1996 and 23 new offers
were made. These not only covered cross-bor-
der trade but also foreign investment activities
in host countries (see Table A9 for an over-
view). The countries participating account for
over 90 percent of the global market. The com-
mitments are to enter into force on 1 January,
1998, unless a country's annex to the agree-
ment specifies a later date.
4
9
Although the exemptions to market access
make it somewhat difficult to estimate the im-
pact of this agreement, with only 20 percent of
telecom markets currently subject to compe-
tition, the price reduction potential is sizable
and hence the prospects for demand expan-
sion.
5
0 For sure, this is one area where con-15
sumers will be able to notice the impact of the
UR liberalization. Such direct UR-related ben-
efits must be made clear to the public so as to
promote the initiation of new rounds as well as
to enhance the success of future trade liberal-
ization rounds.
If the relatively strongly worded statement in
the Singapore Ministerial Declaration helped
pave the way towards an agreement on basic
telecoms, then the financial services nego-
tiations might also be able to benefit. Should
this indeed occur the Singapore meeting will
have provided crucial backing in implementing
major agreements on services.
4. Regional Trade Agreements
The proliferation of regional trade agreements
(RTAs) in recent years had led to a situation by
1994 in which all but 3 of the 128 GATT
members were members of at least one regional
agreement.
5
1 Since regional agreements by
definition discriminate against non-members,
there was reason to fear that the non-discrimi-
nation (i.e. MFN) principles of GATT were
being undermined. It can thus hardly be sur-
prising that one important result of the UR was
to oversee and review regional agreements with
respect to their WTO consistency. This was to
be accomplished by the establishment of a per-
manent committee (see Diagram I).
5
2
The concern about their possible discrimi-
natory impact still prevailed at the Singapore
Ministerial, as is clearly documented by the
context and prominent position this issue was
given in the Declaration: "The expansion and
extent of regional trade agreements make it im-
portant to analyze whether the system of WTO
rights and obligations as it relates to regional
trade agreements needs to be further clarified.
... and to ensure that [they] are complementary
to [the multilateral trading system] and con-
sistent with its rules." While there was a broad
consensus prior to the Singapore Ministerial to
push for tighter control of RTAs, the final
wording did not come up to this level.
Indeed, there is reason enough to push for
greater control over the WTO consistency of
RTAs. First of all, based on a total of 98 agree-
ments notified under Article XXIV of GATT
(through early 1995) only 6 were found to con-
form with the letter of the law.
5
3 And of these
6, just 2 are still in existence (i.e. the customs
union between the Czech and Slovak Republics
and that between the Caribbean Community
and Common Market) (WTO 1995b: Chapter
1). Second, a recent World Bank study of the
Mercosur concluded that the "findings consti-
tute evidence of the potential adverse effects of
[RTAs] on members and on third countries."
 5
4
Third, a global analysis of regional trade agree-
ments came up with enough evidence on the
negative economic impact of RTAs, to substan-
tiate demands that the WTO needs to be stricter
and far more effective in policing RTAs.
5
5
Fourth, it is essential to discipline integration
schemes among developing countries since they
can miss the two basic conditions of Art. XXIV
GATT if they are notified under the afore-
mentioned Enabling Clause (WTO 1995b).
Taking refuge to this "wild card" would indeed
seriously weaken the MFN principle.
Although some of the interfacing difficulties
between the multilateral WTO system and re-
gional trade agreements will gradually be re-
duced, if not eliminated, in the course of
agreed-upon MFN tariff reductions, it is in par-
ticular the other trade-related measures which
will continue to distort trade and investment
flows. And eliminating these distortions will
become all the more important as services and
agricultural products are brought into the WTO
framework. It must thus be feared that if RTAs
are not more forcefully required to abide by
WTO principles across the board, then the fore-
casted gains from the UR will be noticeably
reduced. It can only be hoped that the less than
strong wording in the Singapore Ministerial
Declaration is backed up by stronger efforts on
the part of the respective WTO bodies.
5. Dispute Settlement Mechanism
Out of all the newly created WTO institutions,
the dispute settlement mechanism (DSM), with
its Dispute Settlement Body, Dispute Settle-16
ment Panels and Appellate Body (see Diagram
1), was seen as embodying that strength which
was lacking in the GATT framework: namely
the ability to reach a non-consensus, binding
decision in a dispute concerning an infringe-
ment of prevailing WTO law and — if necess-
ary — dictate its enforcement. In essence, it
finally puts a bite in what used to be a very
muted bark under the GATT regime. Logically,
the expectations pinned on this institution were
quite high as basically the success of the WTO
depended on the effectiveness with which the
threat of sanctions keep member states in-line
with WTO principles. Or rather, in those cases
where infringements do occur, force them to
return to abiding by the principles.
5
6 Further-
more, and just as important, in those cases
where rulings are seen as having erred, either in




By the time the WTO Ministerial was about
to convene in Singapore, 62 disputes had been
brought into the DSM, since then another 26
cases have been submitted (Table 3). In other
words, the DSM is being called upon more
intensively.
5
8 All in all the entire DSM seemed
to be performing well and decisions being
abided by. Hence, there was but little the Singa-
pore Ministerial thought it had to do, except to
state that the DSM should continue to work
effectively.
This may have been an oversight. First of all,
two highly controversial judgments have been
recently passed by dispute panels. One was the
panel decision against the EU's banana regime
which will be the first case in the WTO behind
which massive political pressures stand, not
only from EU and suppliers from the Lome
Group but also from the US. There can hardly
be a question — at least in fact — that the
appellate review will substantiate the panel's
decisions since the case is relatively straight-
forward (it deals with the erection of non-tariff
barriers). The second case was the panel de-
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Source: Own calculations based on WTO website, Dispute Settlement Overview.17
cision against the EU's import prohibition of
hormone-treated meat which challenges the
ability of a member to establish unilaterally
standards based on preferences but not on hard
scientific evidence. Secondly, at such a crucial
meeting as the Singapore Ministerial, whose
purpose it should have also been to ensure that
the UR agreements are freed of inconsistent or
ambiguous wording, it would seem to have
been essential to prompt an analysis of the
cases being brought into the DSM. Such a re-
view could shed light on areas where perhaps
more coherent and/or more precise wording
could reduce the number of disputes in the
future. This must be considered to be all the
more pressing in light of the probable future
increase in dispute settlements as the WTO
moves into the area of services and as environ-
mental as well as sanitary/phytosanitary issues
receive more attention.
V. New Topics
1. Labor Standards: Quo Vadis?
a. Background
At the same time major Asian T&C exporting
countries tried to force attention to the weak-
nesses or rather failings of the ATC, certain
industrialized countries (e.g. the United States,
Norway, Belgium and France) worked hard to
attempt to have a resolution dealing with labor
standards (or social clauses) tabled at the Sin-
gapore Ministerial.
5
9 The goal was to bring
about an effective inclusion of "core" labor
standards into the WTO framework.
6
0
While such issues had never been part of the
GATT framework,
6
1 and did not gain entry into
the WTO agreements, discussion about their
"relevance" had become more intense in recent
years.
6
2 For sure, labor and social issues were
brought to the fore by being constantly and
explicitly mentioned in connection with inter-
national trade during the Marrakech ceremony.
But no doubt the underlying reason for the in-
creased attention they were drawing was simply
that the globalization of production had awak-
ened individuals, pressure groups and politi-
cians to the fact that competitors are no longer
just over the border, but across continents.
High rates of unemployment — especially
among unskilled workers — in numerous Eu-
ropean countries and declining real wages in
such groups in the US provided the necessary
"evidence". Competitive imports were accused
of achieving world market penetration via "ex-
ploitation" of labor under poor working con-
ditions.
6
3 The obvious conclusion was to de-
mand level playing fields as concerns labor
standards. As an attempted first step in this
direction, the United States and Norway sub-
mitted proposals to analyze trade liberalization
in connection with the above mentioned core
labor standards and report back to the 1998
Ministerial. These proposals were not accepted.
Nor were analogies between environmental
standards and labor standards correct as con-
cerns the legitimacy of trade policy measures.
While in the case of environmental standards,
negative consumer externalities (e.g. threats to
consumer's health) can theoretically justify
trade policy measures to be applied against im-
ports, such externalities (at least on the physical
side) do not exist in the case of labor standards.
The damage on the consumer's side is purely
psychological and to allow such damage to
justify trade policy measures would open a
pandora's box of trade-restricting measures.
6
4
The developing countries — particularly
those in Asia — and also some industrialized
countries (e.g. the United Kingdom) took issue
with this approach. In the case of the Asian
countries it was not only because they had al-
ready been subjected to numerous investi-
gations focusing on working conditions in high-
ly labor-intensive production processes. But
also because an overall atmosphere had been
spawned in which labor and social standards18
seemed to be threatening to be introduced by
some ICs as substitutes for agreed-upon tariff
reductions in the UR.
Thereby, the issues should have caused less
contention, since recent studies and develop-
ments had provided a better foundation upon
which the issues could be viewed. First of all
the OECD (1996) carried out an extensive
study on core worker's rights and international
trade. Among other things it showed that (pp.
12-13):
- "there is no correlation at the aggregate level
between real-wage growth and the degree of
observance of freedom-of-association rights;
- there is no evidence that low-standards coun-
tries enjoy a better global export perform-
ance than high-standards countries;
- the price of ... imports of textile products
[e.g., into USA] does not appear to be as-
sociated with the degree of enforcement of
child labor standards in exporting countries;
- there is a positive association over time be-
tween successfully sustained trade reform
and improvements in core standards;
- aggregate [foreign direct investment] data
suggest that core labor standards are not im-
portant determinants [vis-a-vis the location
of investments] in the majority of cases."
Secondly, individual multinational firms in
the context of their corporate governance re-
sponsibility were attempting to ensure that
working conditions (as well as environmental
issues) were given far more attention in foreign
operations or in contracts with foreign firms.
Third, the ILO had been addressing such
issues more actively in recent years and was
also actively promoting its designated responsi-
bilities in this area. That the ILO had certain
competencies in handling the labor standards
complex could be deduced from its tripartite
set-up.
b. What Should Have Been Achieved?
Apart from well-founded arguments against the
effectiveness and usefulness of trade policy in-
strument as a weapon against violation of labor
rights, it is important to maintain the WTO as a
"lean" institution concentrating on its core
issues. Including labor standards in the WTO
would open up areas of contention which
would no doubt exceed those prevailing in the
areas of trade and the environment, anti-dump-
ing or technical barriers to trade.
6
5 Thus if the
WTO is to succeed in fulfilling its mandate vis-
a-vis the numerous, complex and highly de-
manding new UR commitments, it would likely
be placing itself in jeopardy if it included labor
standards. This would all the more be the case,
knowing how difficult it will be to ensure over
a longer period of time that the dispute settle-
ment mechanism efficiently and effectively
enforces WTO principles. After all, the lack of
such enforcement was one basic weakness of
the GATT system. Furthermore, given the high-
ly tight organizational constraints placed on the
WTO, including such issues would probably
push the WTO beyond its capacity to fulfill its
mandate, let alone ruining its effectiveness
(see, for instance, Blackhurst 1996: 8).
In other words, ensuring that labor standards
stay off the Singapore Declaration should have
been a prime aim of all those WTO members
interested in upholding basic GATT/WTO prin-
ciples. Any mention of possible WTO activities
in this area could well lead to more forceful
attempts in the future to include labor standards
in the WTO's fief. If this constellation evolved
it would surely introduce a new generation of
trade-restricting instruments without being able
to enforce better working conditions in DCs.
c. What Was Achieved?
The issue of core labor standards did succeed in
being placed on the Singapore Ministerial De-
claration (paragraph 4), but it did not occur in
connection with extending the WTO's activities
in this direction. Explicitly, the ILO is stated as
being the competent body "to set and deal with
these standards." The fact that it is pointed
out "that economic growth and development
fostered by trade and further trade liberalization
contribute to a promotion of these standards,"
supports the basic thrust of the WTO mandate.
Furthermore, the fact that protectionism in this
connection was rejected and tapping com-19
parative advantages based on low wages was
supported, gives additional backing to the basic
WTO principles.
Hence, it would seem that — despite being
included in the Declaration (even if towards the
beginning of the document) — labor standards
will not influence or rather burden WTO ac-
tivities over the coming years. Nonetheless, this
is for sure not the last time that the topic will
have been brought to the fore in an attempt to
place it in the WTO fief.
2. Competition Policies
a. Background
When GATT was ratified in 1948, trade was
carried out at arms' length, marked by inter-
company rather than intra-company links,
across high tariff and non-tariff barriers, with
products manufactured in one country and sold
in another. Today's conditions differ dramati-
cally, with intercontinental just-in-time deliv-
eries, low tariffs and decreased use of quanti-
tative restrictions, as well as products whose
final production location may neither reflect the
origin of the components nor the origin of the
labor inputs. Declining transaction costs and
the slicing up of the value added chain have
coincided with an unprecedented growth of
mergers and acquisitions. Globalization has
been accompanied by a growing importance of
monopolistic competition and cross-boundary
inter-company networking. But what does this
mean for the WTO?
It was indeed GATT's liberalization thrust
which has brought systemic problems to the
fore, which threaten to slow down, if not thwart
the completion of a truly global trading system
sans significant trade and investment barriers.
One of the central issues is the degree to which
national policies can be applied across inter-
national boundaries. And no problem embodied
the ramification of these issues more than the
clash between the EU and US over the merger
of Boeing and McDonnell-Douglas in the first
half of 1997. While it ended with an approval
of the merger by the EU Commission in July, it
raised fundamental questions. Why should a
merger of two companies in the United States
interest the EU? And if the EU does become
interested, how is this to be interpreted in the
WTO framework?
Following the Uruguay Round agreements
and prior to the Singapore Ministerial, it had
become increasingly apparent that a more open
trading system was consequently revealing
other possible barriers to entry.
6
6 This is docu-
mented in particular by a study on trade and
competition policies published by the OECD
(1994) and another published in 1996
(Bhagwati and Hudec) on fair trade and har-
monization. In the latter it is noted (Levinsohn
1996: 329) that "trade theorists ... seemed to
have ignored the existence of competition pol-
icy when investigating trade policy. The two
interact in important ways, and pretending that
trade policy takes place in the absence of any
antitrust or competition policy is akin to pre-
tending that standard tariff policy takes place in
the absence of any domestic tax structure."
At issue is not only the country of origin
principle, but the principle of market contest-
ability. Hence, the EU objection to the Boeing-
McDonnell-Douglas merger runs counter to the
prevailing country of origin principle, and at
the same time it is based on the supposition that
— particular in strategic industries — market
contestability cannot be ensured by free trade.
However, in the case of the latter, it is not gov-
ernment implemented barriers which restrict




The situation is more complicated than
the extension of competition laws to foreign
mergers. For instance, if a domestic company
opts to shift production abroad it could con-
ceivably be subjected to contingent protection
proceedings (e.g. anti-dumping) initiated by a
domestic company which remained in the coun-
try. Likewise, a foreign company, which had
invested in a given country could initiate




The difficulties in coming up with a solution
to ensure that both trade policies and com-
petition policies work in the same direction, i.e.20
to improve welfare via a more efficient al-
location of resources, are basically due to the
fact that competition policies across countries
differ with respect to their thrust, coverage and
strictness of application. If all markets were
completely contestable, then there would little
need for competition policies. But since this is
not the case, there was an urgency to deal with
the ramifications of the issues at the Singapore
Ministerial. It can hardly be surprising that it
was Hong Kong, an economy where market
contestability (at least in the manufacturing sec-
tor) is completely given, which staunchly lob-
bied for action to be taken in this connection.
b. What Should Have Been Achieved?
From an economic point of view, the issue of
competition policies should have been dealt
with in the context of ensuring that the
maximum of existing GATT/WTO rules could
have been applied to competition policy issues.
Hoekman and Mavroidis (1994), for instance,
see national treatment (Art. Ill), state trading
enterprises (Art. XVII) and "nullification and
impairment" (Art. XXIH) as suitable starting
points to integrating competition policy into the
trading system. Yet, this so-called "effects
doctrine" (national competition rules are ex-
tended to companies falling under foreign juris-
diction) has to cope with the problem how to
avoid international conflicts when market con-
duct of foreign companies violate domestic law
but not foreign law. Unilateral retaliatory
actions following "Section 301" of the US trade
legislation could then become likely. Further-
more, GATT Contracting Parties having no
domestic competition policy at all could fear
not being well enough prepared to have their
companies subjected to foreign competition
law. Thus, the appeal of a genuine international
competition law was undeniable even if the
"effects doctrine" would have minimized the
introduction of new legal measures and would
have widely maintained regulatory competition
for the most appropriate competition policy.
Such "minimum" treatment would have con-
centrated on (1) the impact of anti-competitive
practices by companies and/or organizations on
international trade as well as the impact of
trade policies on competition; (2) the intercon-
nection between investment, competition policy
and trade; (3) the interrelationship between
intellectual property rights and competition pol-
icies; (4) the conflict between competition
policies and limited market access due to gov-
ernment regulated, sanctioned or condoned
monopolies or imperfect competition.
c. What Was Achieved?
In perhaps one of its most important decisions,
the Singapore Ministerial set up a working
group to examine the issues.
6
9 Despite the in-
nocuous wording of this decision and its place-
ment at the end of the Declaration, the impact
should not be underestimated.
7
0 Already the
next year's "centennial" annual report will be
focusing on this subject and in doing so will be
setting the stage for the agenda on the up-
coming WTO round of trade negotiations. The
key question to be answered in this connection
is: Will trade liberalization and GATT/WTO
discipline be best served by adding to the
trading system a global codex harmonizing
national competition policies ex ante or by
mutually recognizing well-functioning national
competition policies (thus sticking to the "ef-
fects doctrine"). Or, should the two avenues
merge in the way that only few common guide-
lines would be negotiated while the majority of
issues would be covered by the existing
GATT/WTO regulations?
3. Accession of New Members
a. Background
Over 50 countries still either have accession
petitions pending or are potential members. But
a glance at Table 1 and Table Al quickly re-
veals that there are primarily just 2 countries
whose accession is of eminent importance to
fulfilling the WTO's brief of representing the
world's trading system: they are greater China
— including Taiwan — and Russia. This is
particularly the case for China, with the largest21
economy after the USA (in purchasing power
terms), as well as one of the fastest growing in
recent years, the second largest recipient of
foreign investment (again after the USA), and
the fifth largest exporter (after the USA, Ger-
many, Japan and France). Given this con-
stellation, discussion here will be focused on
the People's Republic of China. This seems to
be all the more acceptable knowing that many
of the issues China is facing in its accession
process are similar to those faced by Russia,
Vietnam and other countries in transition.
7
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Prior to the Singapore Ministerial, China had
been waiting over ten years since it first sub-
mitted an application (i.e. on July 10, 1986) to
resume its status as a member of GATT.
 7
2 It is
true that the entire process has been com-
plicated by China's insistence to be reinstated
under the status of a GATT signatory Con-
tracting Party.
7
3 However, besides the well-
known political irritations influencing the
United States' position vis-a-vis the terms of
China's membership,
7
4 it was in essence
China's own accession strategy which had long
hindered progress. The "Chinese government
could not tell GATT Contracting Parties how
the Chinese economic system was going to
develop, nor could it say whether or not the
country was going to adapt a market economy.
... [This] situation continued until early 1992
when China declared its determination to
establish a 'socialist market economy'. Follow-
ing this, GATT Contracting Parties decided that
China would be able to perform the funda-
mental obligations of the GATT" (Wang 1996:
56).
Given the basic commitment to establish a
market economy, working party negotiations
proceeded to attempt to achieve agreement on
the contents of the formal WTO accession
protocol.
7
5 These focused not only on market
access, but in particular on the degree to which
China would be able to apply special and
differential treatment granted to all those coun-
tries classified as developing countries. Fur-
thermore, it is still debated in industrialized
countries' circles to what extent China itself as
a developing economy should be allowed to
benefit from all privileges granted under the
Enabling Clause.
As concerns the former, China had submitted
three major tariff reduction offers by the time
of the Singapore Ministerial. While these pro-
posals had progressively reduced the import-
weighted average tariffs from initially 40 per-
cent to 31 percent and then 18.5 percent in the
second offer (see Bach et al. 1996: Table I),
7
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agreement still could not be reached because of
the level of tariffs, but also because of the low
degree of bindings and the prevalence of non-
tariff barriers in numerous areas. The entire
process of establishing a coherent and trans-
parent import regime was further complicated
by pressure from state owned enterprises
(SOEs), which feared being subjected to
additional competitive pressures in the course
of their on-going restructuring process. Finally,
in the context of removing barriers to entry into
the fast-growing Chinese markets were the
restrictions placed on individuals and/or com-
panies to engage in foreign trade.
With respect to China's request to be con-
sidered a developing country (DC), thus enjoy-
ing the possibility to claim special and differ-
ential treatment (i.e. contrary to normal WTO
principles), the standpoint held by the Quad
group (i.e. Canada, the EU, Japan and the USA)
had been that China is simply too large to be
classified as a DC: This applies both in terms of
its economic size as well as its large and rapid-
ly expanding share in world trade (see above).
That trade was expanding especially strong in
areas of labor-intensive products made it
"necessary" for some of the WTO members to
request special safeguards should the inflow of
Chinese products prove to be too disruptive. On
the other hand, access to the Chinese economy
was to be achieved as soon as feasible, at best
within five years, rather than some 15 years
preferred by Chinese officials. And access was
not only interpreted as referring to trade in
goods, but also as applying to services. Like-
wise, regulating intellectual property issues was
seen as crucial in connection with China's need
for access to state-of-the-art technology and
production methods.22
By the time the Singapore Ministerial had
begun, the Chinese position seemed to be re-
flecting a greater realization of what the WTO
required in order to fulfill its brief. This was no
doubt nurtured by evidence that — despite
structural adjustment difficulties — China
would profit greatly from a WTO membership
(see Bach et al. 1996). On the other hand, the
Quad countries were exhibiting a greater degree
of flexibility in their demands reflecting not
only the idea that dealing with Chinese-induced
trade problems could be easier within the con-
fines of the WTO. Beyond this there were
issues pending for the coming century which
needed to be addressed and solved with China's
involvement.
b. What Should Have Been Achieved?
It must be made clear that the issue of ac-
cession of new members was something which
could not have occupied the time of WTO
members during the Singapore Ministerial. The
preinstituted procedures are run independent of
and outside such fora. Nonetheless the Minis-
terial should have made a point of underlining
the necessity to abide by GATT MFN and non-
discriminating principles. While GATT/WTO
does indeed permit deviation from such prin-
ciples, numerous examples of how difficult it is
to move back to the true path, pave the history
of GATT.
7
7 Hence, in light of the forthcoming
challenges brought upon by increased global-
ization and accordingly the need to be able to
efficiently react to undistorted market signals,
strong wording should have been written into
the final declaration. But such wording should
not only be aimed at aspiring new members, but
also at those Contracting Parties requesting
exemptions or long phase-out periods.
c. What Was Achieved?
The accessions of new members to the WTO
was given perfunctory treatment in the Sin-
gapore Ministerial: but two diplomatically
worded sentences in point 8 of the Declaration
can be found. In light of the continuing dif-
ficulties in trying to sort out what China must
liberalize, postpone or be exempted from, a
more forceful effort should have been made.
7
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This must be all the more strongly emphasized
knowing that India recently has been stone-
walling against granting market access (i.e. re-
moval of non-tariff barriers) over a shorter
period than seven years. After all, they main-
tained import controls as a signatory GATT
member on consumer goods due to "balance-of-
payments" reasons for a very extended period
of time. Furthermore, India has copied the
liberalization process of the individual product
categories followed by Canada, the EU and
USA when the ATC liberalization schedule was
setup: the most sensitive products were liber-
alized only at the very end of the period (see
Section UI.l). It can well be assumed that
China, Russia and other transition economies
will be closely observing whether a GATT
signatory country receives preferential treat-
ment in a core area of GATT principles. In
general, the Singapore meeting failed to re-
cognize the advantages of submitting China to
GATT/WTO discipline and of accelerating the
process of shifting domestic measures toward
non-discrimination and transparency. Instead,
the status quo of enforcing unilateral actions
against an alleged state trading economy still
appeals to industrialized countries, probably for
mainly non-economic reasons.
Perhaps the Singapore Ministerial could
have proposed a liberalization process for coun-
tries seeking accession which would ensure that
sensitive industries are subjected to liberal-
ization through out the process, and not just at
the very end. This could be achieved by having
half of each tranche liberalized randomly
selected and the other half selected by the
specific country. This, for instance, would have
helped to dispel some of the criticism of the
ATC and would eliminate much of the back-
loading in other situations. While it is true that
such a randomly generated liberalization pro-
cedure could involve highly sensitive areas
being liberalized initially, it does have the
advantage of doing this completely impartially.
And this should be a welcomed ingredient in
trade negotiations as far as WTO principles are
concerned.23
VI. The WTO after Singapore: Much Still to Do
The First WTO Ministerial Conference was
not a breakthrough in committing the Con-
tracting Parties to more forcefully implement
what was ratified in Marrakech. Nor did it
pave the way to speeding up the accession of
new members like China and Russia — whose
application have been long pending. In ad-
dition, what appeared to be a clear success in
liberalizing new sectors like information tech-
nology, must be viewed more skeptically in the
light of the small print following the an-
nouncements.
Specifically, much still must be done in the
following areas:
(i) Nothing was done to correct the meager
implementation record (i.e. "sham liberaliza-
tion") in the phasing out of market access
restrictions in textiles and clothing. As a result
of postponing liberalization of the most sensi-
tive products to the latest possible moment, it
must be feared that an impasse is deliberately
being created which could well permit but yet
another postponement in the elimination of
very costly non-tariff barriers. Again, sticking
to reciprocity when unilateral liberalization
steps within the WTO framework would prom-
ise sizable welfare gains — as all CGE model
estimates show — signals a revival of mer-
cantilistic principles, which should long have
been overcome in the era of global markets
and just-in-time manufacturing.
(ii) The core of market access was seemingly
brushed over to make room for an agreement
on free trade in information technology pro-
ducts which is flawed for two reasons. First,
it excludes highly protected consumer elec-
tronics and second, it expanded the inter-
national marketing "cartel" for semiconductors
to include the EU and Korea ( aside from the
founding members US and Japan). Likewise,
ensuring that technical and similar standards
did not prove to be increasing barrier to trade
was relegated to an also-mentioned position.
(Hi) Anti-dumping measures, being the essence
of so-called contingent protection, have con-
tinued to play a major role in trying to reduce
competition. Though their use by industri-
alized countries slowed down noticeably, a
new threat arose, as developing countries (with
AD legislation now on their books) no longer
refrain from opening anti-dumping procedures
against industrialized countries and even more
so against other developing countries. Further-
more, no attempt was taken to ensure that
instead of the prevailing narrow industry per-
spective, a national balance sheet of gains and
losses (including interests of consumers and
industrial purchasers) is required in the future
in order to restrict introduction and prolifer-
ation of these measures.
(iv) The Singapore Ministerial failed to clearly
set the stage for fulfilling the WTO's brief as a
universal institution. No clear guidelines were
established to quickly and effectively bring
Russia and China into the WTO.
(v) Restricting refuge in the exceptions of non-
discrimination, for instance by developing
countries drawing the "wild card" of the En-
abling Clause in regional integration schemes,
was not successful.
(vi) Finally, it may be too early to extrapolate
the considerable success of the dispute settle-
ment mechanism. It still remains to be seen
whether Contracting Parties will really accept
decisions against their expressed interests in
issues of critical importance as in the EU
banana case, or in cases where arguments of
national security are invoked. So far, however,
the success of the DSM has exceeded ex-
pectations.
There is one issue which deserves utmost
attention when it comes to subjecting Con-
tracting Parties to GATT/WTO discipline. In
the future, the lion's share of measures in-
fluencing access to markets will no longer
focus on border measures but rather on dom-
estic measures. Yet, domestic measures are
deeply rooted in institutional settings of the
individual countries determined by preferen-
ces, income levels, culture and history. They
are in essence immobile elements of a coun-
try's resource endowment and should be al-24
lowed to be exposed to competition from other
regulatory systems by mutual recognition, pro-
vided certain minimum rules are met. This is
the core of the so-called rules of origin country
principle.
However, there is reason for concern that
the WTO, with the prevailing MFN and na-
tional treatment principles, based on the coun-
try of destination principle will be pushed by
the large trading countries, favoring ex ante
harmonization of domestic rules, thereby going
far beyond the minimum requirements. While
at the Singapore Ministerial the launching of
ex ante harmonization could be prevented in
labor standards and also investment regu-
lations, the trend towards harmonization in
environmental standards is already on the way.
It must be feared that the key argument in
favor of ex ante harmonization, the existence
of public goods and market failure, will be
extended much too far to encompass all
domestic measures which have a bearing on
international trade and investment. Yet, in the
majority of cases, the effects of violating non-
discrimination principles, would have to be
shouldered by those who exert such restric-
tions and thus be internalized. Countries, for
instance, which discriminate against non-resi-
dents in investment, would be shooting them-
selves in their foot, as they would attract less
investment.
In the past, the key characteristics of the
GATT, the reliance on the country of desti-
nation principle, was not a major weakness as
long as the removal of border measures and
the ex ante harmonization of certain regula-
tions in international trade (for instance, cus-
toms valuation, common tariff nomenclature)
offered positive externalities. With the shift
from border to domestic measures, such ex-
ternalities are becoming rarer. Instead, it has to
be feared that those Contracting Parties, whose
interests are to contain regulatory competition
in order to slow down the adjustment pressure,
will abuse the WTO as a forum to enforce
these interests by urging for ex ante har-
monization. The Singapore Ministerial was
able to defend the WTO against such vested
interests in labor standards. But having won
this battle does not guarantee that the war will
be won. If the Singapore Ministerial had, how-
ever, first concentrated on its unfinished core
task of WTO/GATT discipline in applying
border measures and then marked the starting
point of minimizing the use of the country of
destination principle in subjecting domestic
measures to GATT/WTO discipline, this First
WTO Ministerial could be rightly heralded as
a milestone in balancing common principles
and national diversity.25
Annex
Table Al —WTO Membership Status as of August 1, 1997
































































































United Arab Emirates (10/4)




























































Turkey (26/3) Bulgaria (1/12) Albania (p)
Poland (1/7) Armenia (p)
Cyprus (30/7) Azerbaijan (p)
Slovenia (30/7) Belarus (p)












aInitial WTO members. — ''Day/month of membership in (). —
 c(p) = pending . — ^Approved 2/10/1996; membership 30 days
after national approval.
Source: Based on WTO membership list on WTO home page.27














aBillion US$. — t>World
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 eKennedy Round. —
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— ^Manufactured imports
this is only the goods part
the services now integratec




















23 10 20 35
33 - - -
34 - 25 -
22 3 3 - -
45 5 4 -
48 40 21 35 8.7
99 300 19 34 4.76/6.3"
123 4,1801 99J 35 3.88
exports taken from IMF (1972: xii-xiii and 1996: 114-115). —
 cIn percent. — doillon Round.
Tokyo Round. — SWeighted average in world's nine major industrial markets (WTO 1996a: 6).
into industrialized countries (Martin and Winters 1993: 9). — 'Uruguay Round. —JNote that
of the UR results. On top of this figure which is total merchandise trade, come the results from all
1 or to be integrated into the WTO. To be comparable with the prior figures it should be adjusted
"0 members. However, since most of those not in the WTO have applied for membership, it will
Source: Jackson (1994: 53).
Table A3 — Overview of Computable General Equilibrium Assessments of the Uruguay Round
a — Sectoral Distribution of

































































see original for specifics. — bstudy:
et al. (1995); 3 = Francois et al. (1995); 4 = Francois et al. (1994); 5 = Yang (1994); (












1 = Hertel et al.
> = Nguyen et al.
under differing assumptions; the reader is advised to
ables in the articles to examine in depth the structure and the underlying assumptions. — ^static. —
; not perfect competition (PC). — gSteady state. — "Steady state, no PC.28
Table A4 — Unweighted (A)
a and Trade-Weighted (B)
b Distribution of Prevailing Set Growth Rates (%) for Selected T&C





















































aBased on growth rates averaged over the number of products restrained






























— bBased on trade-weighted growth
' represent the number of products restrained by
EU. The numbers in () in "B" represent the sum of trade-weighted shares covered by restraints in percent of total T&C
imports.
Source: Own calculations based on GATT COM.TEX documents from Textiles Surveillance Body.
Table A5 — Tariff Concessions Given and Received: Post Uruguay Round Tariff Rates

































































































































































. — ^Weighted changes; calculated by dT/(l+T) in percent. —
 cLow- and
High-Income Economies as listed in Finger et al. (1996: Table 1). —
 dExcludes























































































Middle-Income Economies as well as
fish, includes tariff equivalents of non-tariff barriers. —
Source: Excerpted from Finger et al. (1996: various tables in sections G.I, G.2, R.I and R.2).29
Table A6 — International Trade in Information Technology (IT)
a and Textile and Clothing (T&C)
















































































































aSITC divisions 75, 76 and 776. —
 bSITC divisions 65 and 84. — cUnderlined shares
in exports/imports. — dvalue
includes intra-custom union

































































represent above world average share
of exports to world in billion US$. —
 eShare in respective exporters/importers total
exports. — SExtra-EU IT
exports/imports: 7.6/10.6.







 nExtra-EU IT exports/imports:
exports/imports: 3.3/12.1. —
 kExtra-EU IT
Source: WTO (1996a, Vol. II: Tables IV 38, -39, -52, -53, -59, -60).30




































































aAverage per year. Since data for some countries are
bFrom 1/7 to 30/6. —
 cFrom 1/1/1980 to :
data. —
 fFrom 1/7/1994 to
on data 1989-1993 (GATT
50/6/1984.
30/6/1995. — gAs of June
1994c: 57). —
1/1/1990 to 31/12/1994 (WTO 1995c: Table
cols 1-3 based on data from
JFor col. ;
IV.2). —
WTO (1996g: Table III.6)
— °For col. 3 based on data 1990-1994 WTO (1997c
IV.7). — QFor col. 3 based
1993: Table IV. 10).















































































































actions could be slightly higher. —
— dFrom 1/7/1984 to 30/6/1989. — eYearly average
30th (1997). — hlncludes countries not listed. — 'For
based on data in WTO (1997d: 31). —
of available
col. 3 based
Tor col. 3 based on data
For col. 3 based on data 1990-1994 (GATT 1995: 72-73). — "Tor
—
 nFor col. 3 based on data 1990-1994
: 64). — PFor col. 3 based on





. 3 based on data 1980-1992 (GATT
Source: For cols 1 and 2 basically (see above) Finger (1993: Table 1.1); for cols 4 and 5 WTO (1995b: Annex B); for cols 6
and 7 WTO (1996c: Annex C).31
Table A8 — Anti-Dumping Actions




















































































































































> the values may differ slightly from Table A7.
aIn the years 1990-96 bold type indicate
represent the lowest number







































s the highest number of actions in the period; the numbers i
in the period. — The annual reports cover the period
throughout entire period. —
 eIncludes Caribbean countries.
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and
Europe/USSR. — "Northern Africa frorrl Morocco
Yugoslavia. — gAll other former socialist
o Egypt plus Israel, Turkey, Cyprus and Malta








































































from 1/7 to 30/6. —
— ^Includes Bulgaria,
countries in Eastern
. — 'All other African
also Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri
'includes also Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, the Philippines and Papua New Guinea.
Lanka. —
Source: GATT, WTO documents of AD notifications.32



















































































































































































































x x x ES
x CT x
X X




46 37 36 28
60 51 50 28
Note: From the original overview table the following specifically labled columns were not included: private leased circuit services; other terrestrial
mobile services; fixed satellite services; trunked radio services.
aRanked by revenues 1 n col. (2). — ^Letters in () signify phased-in commitments.
fLD = domestic long-distance. — 81 = internationa
transmission. — JIncluded analog and/or





: USA: direct-to-home (DTH)
satellite services by geostationary satellites; India:




 C1994; millions. —
 d1995; US$, billions. —
 eL = local. —
= resale of public voice. —
value-added services
— 'it was permitted to offer
'Includes circuit switched and/or packet switched data
I = internet access; ES = earth station; VPN = virtual private
specific services initially without the usual MFN conditions.
and direct-broadcast-satellite (DBS)
application of differential measures
Brazil: direct radio/tel. programming; Argentina: fixed
between gov./gov.-run operator and outside operators;
neighboring, countries for land/sat, connections. Also see India exemption; Pakistan: see India; Bangladesh: see India. —
mPhase-in of facilities-based voice service for Greece. Ireland and Portugal. — "Commitments conditional upon passage of national legislation. —
"Commits to improve offer once nationa legislation adopted — PWhere no public voice commitments, voice via closed user groups committed.
— ^Commits to review the possibility of allowing market access for additional suppliers in voice telephone services.
Source: For col. (1) World Bank (1996: Tab. 1); for col. (2) WTO website, Services 17/2/1997; for cols. (3)-(ll) WTO
website, Services, Annex 1; for col. (12) WTO website, Services, 6/3/1997.33
Endnotes
' Article IV, p. 8 stipulates that the Ministerial shall be held "at least once every two years ... [and it has] the authority to
take decisions on all matters under any of the Multilateral Trade Agreements" (GATT 1994a).
^ See Table Al of signatory members of the WTO, new members since Marrakech, as well as those awaiting membership.
3 This can be easily documented by comparing the respective preambles in the GATT (GATT 1994a: 486) and WTO
(GATT 1994a: 6) treaties (similar or identical passages are underlined by author):
"Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should be conducted with a view to
raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and
effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use
of the world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and
preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and
concerns at different levels of economic development, ... Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering
into reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers
to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade relations. ..."
4 For an initial analysis of the UR see Langhammer (1994).
Needless to say many of these issues listed covered wide-ranging topics, reflecting in essence the organizational setup of
the WTO. For instance, market access included not only the agreed-upon tariff concessions but also non-tariff barriers.
In particular, trade liberalization in the agricultural sector is not discussed in the following as it did not play a major role
in Singapore.
^ For an indepth treatment of this topic see Baughman et al. (1997).
° This is not quite true, as there was actually one T&C article on the liberalization list of one industrialized country.
Baughman et al. (1997) mentioned it as well as the WTO Council for Trade in Goods (WTO 1996b: para. 16.4). The
item was "work gloves" and the country liberalizing this item was Canada.
" These factors rapidly all caused the share of Asian countries in the increase in T&C exports to decline from over 100
percent in the period 1990-1993 to about 40 percent in the period 1993-1995. To the extent that Asian T&C firms
shifted production to Latin America or Eastern Europe their share in world markets would have decreased less. Asian
producers did indeed expand production facilities in Latin America, but hardly at all in Eastern Europe.
'" The tranches were to encompass 16, 17, 18 and 49 percent of imports of all specified T&C products, based on volumes
in the year 1990.
" As of 1/1/1995 the growth rates are to be increased by 16 percent; as of 1/1/1998 they are to be increased by 25 percent;
as of 1/1/2002 they are to be increased by 27 percent.
The listing of products covered by the ATC is based on 6-digit HS categories. These categories are allocated to groups
of products encompassing tops/yarns, fabrics, made-ups and clothing. In the case of the EU, total ATC imports in 1990
(the year upon which the Agreement is based) is made up of 37 percent tops and yarns, 22 percent fabrics, 24 percent
made-ups and 17 percent clothing (in volume terms).
'
3 As can be seen in Table A4, whether one looks at the non-weighted or weighted allocation of MFA products for selected
Asian countries, for most countries growth rates of 4 percent or below prevail. In the case of Hong Kong it can be
determined that over 60 percent of T&C products have designated growth rates of 2 percent or less.
'4 In essence almost all topics dealt with in Singapore are encompassed somehow by market access. This section excerpts
from all these topics and discusses tariff reductions on goods, be they those agreed upon in the UR, those focussed on in
the ITA or those conceded to the least developed countries. It excludes treatment of specific topics (e.g. the ATC, anti-
dumping rules, technical standards or agricultural products) analyzed elsewhere in this paper. By not dealing with non-
tariff barriers it further differs from the Market Access Committee (see Diagram 1), which covers "market access issues
related to tariffs [and] non-tariff measures not covered by any other WTO body ..." (WTO 1996c: 1).
" Unless otherwise noted tariff rates, reductions, bindings etc. discussed in this section are drawn from Finger et al.
(1996).
'" These figures differ from those published by GATT (see e.g. GATT 1994b), but the picture which develops is the same:
the sizeable increases in tariff bindings by LMIEs noticeably improved the preconditions for trade with these countries.
The TPR mechanism represents a forum in which a non-confrontational discussion of trade policy issues takes place. It
is, in essence, the only peer review in the WTO. While the roughly 60 members reviewed since its inception in 1989
account for 98 percent of the WTO member countries' trade in goods and services, there are still about 50 countries
which had not been analyzed by 1996 (see e.g. WTO 1996d: para 4).
'° Only the four largest trading entities (i.e. the EU, USA, Japan and Canada) are reviewed every two years. The next
sixteen trading entities are covered every four years and the remaining every six years or — for least developed — for an
even longer period of time.34
'" Table A6 also provides a comparison with T&C products. It not only shows that whereas the relative exports of these
products have tended to decrease in importance in LMIE countries, they have remained constant or even increased in
importance in HIEs. Italy represents a remarkable case of an HIE where T&C exports greatly exceed IT exports.
" It has been estimated that UR MFN tariff reductions have led to reductions in GSP tariff margins by roughly 9 percent in
the case of the USA, 15 percent in the case of Japan and 23 percent in the case of the EU.
In addition to GSP, there are other three types of special treatment permitted by the UR agreements, namely fewer
obligations vis-a-vis their own policies, longer time frames to apply UR rules, and provisions dealing with training and
special assistance. These will not be dealt with here. The reader is referred to Finger and Winters (1996) for further
information in this connection.
22 This was enacted in 1979 in connection with the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations.
3 It might be added, however, that in the area of agricultural products, "dirty tariffication" (i.e. tariff bindings higher than
actual protection in 1994) will actually increase tariff barriers and could thus improve the preferences for some products
(e.g., see Martin and Winters 1995: 16).
*• This is the so-called "reverse notification" procedure. That is, only when something has not or cannot be accomplished
is the WTO notified.
25 In the Council of Goods' listing of waivers a large number of postponements are simply due to not being able to enact
the necessary Harmonized System (HS) of product classification. As technical as this matter is, it is essential for
establishing the universe of products with which UR agreements are carried out. It is also particularly important in those
cases where products are reclassified and end up being assigned higher tariff rates. Such quasi-hidden tariff increases run
counter to GATT/WTO principles. Should this occur, other member countries may appeal to the WTO to have the lower
tariff rates reinstated. The US, for instance, has requested dispute settlement in a case with an EU reclassification of
certain computer equipment (LAN adapter equipment). The panel is due to report in the fall of 1997 (WTO [WT/DS 62,
Active Panels, 8(a)] 1997, as cited in WTO website, Dispute Board Bulletin).
2
6 This was to be achieved in four equal steps, i.e. on 1/7/1997, 1/1/1998, 1/1/1999 and 1/1/2000. Furthermore, all other
duties and/or charges are to be removed as of 1/7/97.
27 In Singapore the initial 29 countries accounted for 83 percent of the trade in IT products.
28 Accession to the agreement was enhanced by granting exemptions to the conditions that all products needed to be
liberalized by 1/1/2000. Hence, Costa Rica, Indonesia, India, Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand were granted such
an exemption, which extends compliance through, but not beyond 2005.
2" The body is set up to oversee market access and is euphemistically called the World Semiconductor Council. It met
earlier this year in Hawaii to lay down strategies. No more full members will be accepted, only "associate" memberships,
with no official voice, will be permitted.
™ The GSTP contains trade preferences conceded by developing countries in favor of developing countries. It dates back
to 1988 and is notified under the Enabling Clause (WTO 1996a, Vol. I: 41).
3' The EU's GSP legislation, for instance, contains "withdrawal clauses" not included in the prior version. This opens a
door to withdrawing GSP privileges if labor standards are found lacking or "unfair" trading practices established.
32 it might be noted that in the original 1986 opening UR declaration (GATT 1986) there is no specific mention of dealing
with ADMs, so as to minimize, if not eliminate their protectionist thrust. That they do indeed have a severe and
multifaceted impact is succinctly described and analyzed by Messerlin (1989).
33 It should be made clear that "initiating" proceedings is just the first step in a series of measures. Although the key step is
the final approval of AD duties or the acceptance of price undertakings, the initiation of proceedings must definitely be
considered to be part of the trade-impeding package. That is, initiation in itself reduces imports by — inter alia —
frightening away small companies (see Messerlin 1989 in this respect).
34 The rules of origin are particularly crucial in such cases where the international division of labor is extensively used in
manufacturing a product. It cannot be surprising that Hong Kong, for instance, has been subjected to numerous
proceedings because of its very strong production links with neighboring regions of China. With China leading the list
of countries most often hit by ADMs, Hong Kong firms are often accused regardless of the fact that they have nothing to
do with the case. And in doing so, e.g. in the case of the EU, the initiators often submit firm data which contains
numerous notations of companies not in existence. Such "padding" of lists is just one way to do "justice" to satisfying
AD regulations.
35 The exporting countries were China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and Taiwan. The dumping margins were
estimated to be 28-36 percent.
3° The irony of the situation was that more jobs were probably being destroyed than "saved." That is, the number of jobs
being negatively affected in the highly competitive EU finishing industry processing AD-affected intermediates was
substantially larger than those being saved in weaving.
37 What will not be discussed here is the application of standards in the area of services. To begin with, the GATS is just in
the process of being prepared for enaction on the liberalization schedules submitted to the WTO. Secondly, the area is so35
wrought with unknowns at the moment that it would difficult to give due treatment to the subjects matter in the space
available.
But even here the WTO is slowly expanding its coverage: in May, 1997, guidelines for recognition of qualifications in
the accountancy sector were adopted. This is obviously an important prerequisite for being able to conclude negotiations
on financial services. Another area, namely airline safety standards and flight regulations, have — despite their obvious
importance — been not specifically covered by GATS. Hence it basically still remains a virtual domain of the US
authorities or rather (to a lesser degree) their European counterparts, e.g. to certify which flight paths can be flown over
water by two-engine planes as opposed to those with three or more engines. The failure of a specific type of plane to be
granted such a certification (called ETOPS) obviously reduces its market value vis-a-vis competing operating under
ETOPS certification. Given the high profile of the aircraft industry in the US and Europe there is surely room for
"strategic protectionism" in this connection.
3
8 See GATT (1994a: 69-84) for "Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures" and GATT
(1994a: 138-162) for "Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade."
3" It should be noted that one of the most prominent initial cases brought before the DSM (by Brazil/Venezuela against the
USA) dealt with technical standards of gasoline and unfair differentiated treatment of imported versus domestically
produced products. The USA lost the case, even in the appellate review, and accordingly, if not naturally, proceeded to
implement changes.
4" These include all industrial and agricultural products (1) not covered by the sanitary and phytosanitary agreement and
(2) not addressed in the Agreement on Government Procurement.
41 While there is no doubt that the azo-dyes can cause cancer, what still cannot be substantiated is whether the virtual
elimination of azo-dyes was indeed necessary or whether a reduction would have sufficed or whether even a warning
tag, stating that for certain skin-sensitive individuals such dyes could cause irritation and possibly skin cancer, would
have been adequate.
42 Another difficulty encountered by companies attempting to abide by the regulation was that there was no prescribed
testing procedure. The result was that whereas one method would indicate an acceptable level, another test would show
the reverse. Hence, even such specifications need to be included in the notification process.
43 The European Court of Justice ruled in 1987 that the German Purity Law, which restricted imports of beer to those
brewed only with yeast, malt (from barley), hops and water, was in essence a trade barrier. This led to lables being used
to identify beers brewed according to or not according to the German Purity Law.
44 The suspension of negotiations was done in a manner which "froze" all the offers of those participating. This meant that,
whenever they would be resumed, the offers tabled so far would represent the minimum; i.e. they could only be
improved upon, but not reduced.
45 Needless to say this wording contrasts sharply with the language used in connection with the ATC.
46 The total revenue from basic telecoms in 1995 amounted to roughly US$600 billion, about as much as trade in IT
products. About 14 percent of those can be attributed to mobile services and 10 percent to intercontinental services
(WTO 1997: 3).
4' For instance, from 1990-95 main telephone lines increased by annually 3.5 percent in industrialized countries but 13.8
percent in developing countries. In telecom revenues, industrialized countries revealed an annual increase of 4.2 percent
during this period as opposed to 9.7 percent for developing countries (WTO 1997: 3). The potential can also be seen by
comparing the population and revenues in Table A9. The table does not include either China or Russia — figures for
which the potential would be even larger.
4° In making their initial offers under the GATS, members were allowed to limit the areas to which liberalization applied
and/or restrict MFN application, but only on a one-off basis.
49 The agreement covers services in voice telephone, data transmission, telex, telegraph, fax, leased circuits, cellular
phones, mobile data transmission and personal communication.
5" Estimates of the impact include a US$1 trillion decrease in prices of domestic services over a three-year period (see
Financial Times: Feb 14, 1997) as well as an 80 percent decrease in prices of international calls (South China Morning
Post 1997a).
5' The three members were Hong Kong, Japan and South Korea (see Sampson 1996: 88).
52 By the end of 1996 the Committee was examining 21 regional trade agreements.
53 Article XXIV of GATT stipulates under which conditions a regional trade agreement can be established. The two basic
conditions are the "substantially-all-trade" and the "generally-not-more-restrictive" requirements.
54 See Yeats (1997: iii). The Mercosur consists of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay and was established in 1991.
5
5 The study (Brookings: 1997) underlined not only the impact of distortions causing trade and investment diversion, it
also pointed to the lack of transparency in tariff levels, rules of origin and trade-related measures. Sampson (1996: 89)
notes, the EU alone has 14 different sets of preferential rules of origin while the United States has 6.36
5" As Schott (1997: 71) notes: "the DSM provides a warranty that the bill of goods sold to a participant during a trade
negotiations will be dutifully delivered ...".
5' Within this entire framework very specific time limits were set so cases would be settled within a maximum of 20
months, or 16 months if no appellate procedure is involved.
5° Despite the large increase in total cases, it is interesting to note that a sizeable share was being settled outside the panel
process; i.e. 13 cases were settled otherwise. Not yet included in this number was the agreement reached between the
EU and the USA in April concerning the Helms-Burton Act (otherwise known as the Cuban Liberty and Democratic
Solidarity Act). The reason for not being included is that merely a stay of application through the end of President
Clinton's term of office has been agreed. The Act itself is still on the books, but the panel, which began work on
November 20, 1996, was suspended on April 25, 1997 upon request of the EU.
5" Environmental issues represent a less controversial issue on the docket of the Ministerial; after all the preamble of the
UR already contains wording in this direction (see Section I) and a Committee on Trade and the Environment had
already been established in Marrakech. The environmental issues did not represent a stumbling block in the negotiations
leading up to Singapore. Perhaps the key thrust of work in this area is to ensure that basic GATT/WTO principles of an
open, transparent and non-discriminatory trading system are not prejudiced by environmental standards ratified in
multilateral environmental agreements. The Ministerial Declaration (paragraph 16) accordingly concludes that "the
breadth and complexity of the issues covered by the Committee [on Trade and Environment] shows that further work
needs to be undertaken." For a discussion of potential areas of "green" protectionism and relevant GATT/WTO rules see
Sorsa(1995).
60 Charlene Barshefsky, Acting US Trade Representative, is quoted as stating that "if the importance and relevance of the
issue was not reflected in the Ministerial Declaration, there might as well be no Declaration" (Suri 1997: 11).
6' Article XX of the GATT does stipulate that trade measures can be introduced "to protect human, animal or plant life or
health" or "relating to products of prison labour." However, these stipulations have never been interpreted and applied
in the sense that labor standards are foreseen.
6
2 As Waer (1996: 25-27) notes, the United States already (unsuccessfully) attempted in 1987 and 1990 to establish a
working party to look into the issue in the GATT council meetings. To be examined were freedom of association,
freedom to organize and bargain collectively, freedom from forced labor, minium employment age and minimum
working conditions.
63 It is thus hardly surprising that President Clinton had to reach two separate agreements with Mexico concerning labor
standards and environmental protection in order to ensure passage of the NAFTA treaty.
64 See for a discussion of this important difference Anderson (1995).
65 it is not so surprising that the European Social Contract is conjuring up similar difficulties in the EU. Germany's
attempt to impose higher wage levels on workers, particularly on foreign workers in the German domestic construction
industry, even in firms run by other EU nationals, foreshadows the problematics which could evolve here.
66 As Langhammer (1994: 20) noted: "All of the above issues for a new round [of trade negotiations] imply a weakening of
the country of origin principle and an ex-ante [strengthening of] harmonization, for instance in connection with common
competition, environmental, social or migration standards." [Translation by the author.]
67 At issue were not only sunk costs in aircraft production, but also the degree to which government subsidies in the
defense construction side of production could be used to cover costs on the civilian projects (cross subsidization). This
was an issue since the Airbus industry did not have the production structure which would allow such tactics.
6° This happened in the EU (Sony versus Phillips) and in the US (Brother versus Smith-Corona).
69 That the importance of this issue is not well understood is clearly reflected in the simple fact that hardly an article
dealing with the results of the Singapore Ministerial contained any comment on competition policies.
70 Following the confrontations between the EU and the US over the Boeing-McDonnell-Douglas merger, the EU Trade
Commissioner, Sir Leon Brittan, called for WTO competition rules to avoid such disputes in the future (Financial Times
1997b).
7' As concerns Taiwan, its accession is less a question of fulfilling the criteria of a market economy, than a question of the
international political constellation surrounding the PRC's accession.
72 The official working party for China's accession request was established on March 4, 1987 and predates any other
application now pending. It had already been granted GATT observer status in 1982 and in December, 1983 was
signatory to the MFA.
73 China had participated in the negotiations leading up to the establishment of GATT in 1948 and was one of the 23 initial
members or Contracting Parties. Its membership, however, was withdrawn in 1950 by the National Chinese government
which had retreated to Taiwan. The legality of this withdrawal is one of the legal issues remaining as a major bone of
contention. Specifically: was the Nationalist government in Taiwan at that time still the de jure government of all of
China?37
74 One key issue here is the Jackson-Vanik clause in the 1974 Trade Act which stipulates that the US Congress must
approve China's MFN status every year. Among GATT/WTO members, however, MFN is automatic.
75 Parallel to this process are bilateral negotiations to clarify individual issues.
76 Calculations from the third offer are not available.
77 The classic example is no doubt the case on non-tariff barriers in textile and clothing trade. Some 35 (sic!) years ago
Ludwig Erhard, the German Economics Minister at that time, stated in an interview that the "accord ... reached in the
field of textiles inside GATT ..., seem[ed] to be a practicable way to gain the breathing spell one must grant the textile
and clothing industries in Europe to adjust themselves to new market conditions" (Sung 1962). And should these
barriers finally be eliminated (as stated in the ATC — see above) by the year 2005, they will have been in force for
almost 45 years.
78 While progress has been made on numerous issues in the negotiation with China, the key principle of market access still
stands out as a major bone of contention. With the ITA having now been concluded, the Telecom pact having been
agreed upon and negotiations on financial services well underway to be completed by the end of the year, much is still
left to be done. Nonetheless, the message that the WTO means business must be getting through as China's Vice-
Premier openly pronounced in an interview (South China Morning Post 1997b) that China believes "that world trade
needs an overall unified framework and rules of the game everyone accepts. Otherwise, there will be a world trade war
which would serve no-one's interests."38
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